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HOW WILL THE UK TRIGGER ARTICLE 
50 TEU?
Article 50(1) TEU anticipates that the UK will use its own 
constitutional arrangements to trigger and manage the 
withdrawal process. Academic and practising lawyers 
are perplexed as to the definitions and details of these 
constitutional requirements. The European Union Referendum 
Act 2015 does not set out the manner in which the result 
of the 23 June 2016 referendum should be implemented. 
However, the government made a political promise to 
implement the result. The UK government has argued that 
it can invoke the Royal Prerogative to trigger Article 50 TEU, 
without Parliamentary scrutiny.1 Thus the referendum result 
pits the mandate of direct democracy against Parliamentary 
Sovereignty, the UK constitution’s defining principle. A taste 
of these complexities and lack of consensus amongst lawyers 
can be found on the UK Constitutional Law Blog.2 What has 
emerged in the first 100 days since the referendum result 
is that the PM, Theresa May, intends to keep a very tight 
rein over the Brexit procedures and negotiations, the role of 
Parliament and, indeed, her own Ministers.
After weeks of speculation PM May announced the first steps 
of the Article 50 TEU decision on 2 October 2016 addressing 
the Conservative Party Annual Conference: a “Great Repeal 
Bill” will replace the European Communities Act 1972 and 
the Article 50 TEU notice to the EU will be sent by the end of 
March 2017.  This date is seen as realistic, presuming that 
the legal challenges being made to the way the Article 50 
TEU process is being managed have concluded.  The most 
important challenge will not be heard by the Divisional Court 
1. The Government’s skeleton argument in the litigation pending before 
the Divisional Court, listed to be heard on 13 October 2016, has been 
published at: https://www.bindmans.com/uploads/files/documents/
Defendant_s_Detailed_Grounds_of_Resistance_for_publication.PDF
2.  https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/blog/
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INTRODUCTION
•  Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) will 
govern the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. 
•  The use of Article 50 TEU is unprecedented and withdrawal 
will be governed by both legal and political processes within 
the UK, the EU and the World Trade Organization, making it a 
complex undertaking. 
•  In this context, several aspects of the interpretation and 
application of Article 50 TEU pose particular challenges. 
These include domestic controversy regarding the 
constitutional requirements for triggering Article 50 TEU, the 
short time-span of negotiation, and the uncertain role for the 
UK in trade negotiations with the EU and the rest of the world 
during the withdrawal process. 
This paper outlines these issues, focusing in particular 
on the EU and international trade (rather than domestic 
constitutional) dimensions of withdrawal, in order to provide 
clarity and highlight potential pitfalls affecting both the EU 
and the UK.
The process of the UK withdrawing from the EU is governed 
by Article 50 TEU, introduced into EU law by the Treaty of 
Lisbon 2007. The authors of this Treaty Article have admitted 
that it was never intended to be used but was carried forward 
from the earlier failed discussions of the Constitutional 
Treaty. Article 50 TEU focuses on the procedural aspects of 
withdrawal from the EU, using the concept of a voluntary 
application, as opposed to the procedure for expulsion from 
the EU. Although the Article 50 TEU procedure appears 
straightforward, the legal uncertainty of the process has been 
exposed since the referendum result.
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commence withdrawal negotiations, even informally, until the 
UK triggers Article 50 TEU. When it does so, the UK must 
move quickly.  As outlined under Article 50(3) TEU, a two year 
negotiation period commences - a very short time to unravel 
44 years of EU membership and contemplate the future 
relationship with the EU and other trading partners. Though 
the period can be extended, it requires the unanimous 
agreement of EU Member States to do so; the UK will not 
have control of the negotiating timeline. 
Furthermore, after allowing the exiting Member State to 
choose when it will start the process of withdrawal the EU 
process is weighted in favour of the EU-27. The European 
Council will develop the guidelines for the European 
Commission to lead the withdrawal process and will agree to 
the withdrawal using a qualified majority vote in the Council. 
Recently, the PM of Malta, Joseph Muscat, the Head of State 
overseeing the EU Council Presidency in 2017 told Sky News 
that once the UK triggers Article 50 TEU the EU Council will 
debate and draft the European Commission guidelines very 
quickly – within four to six weeks of the notice. The UK will 
be up against tough and experienced negotiators: Michel 
Barnier is leading the European Commission team, with 
Sabine Weyand as a second chief negotiator. The agreement 
would need to be approved by the UK and 20 of the 27 
remaining Member States, representing 65% of those states’ 
population. The European Parliament also must approve the 
agreement, voting by a simple majority, but ironically the UK 
MEPs would still retain the right to vote on this deal.4
4.  The European Parliament should also be “immediately and fully 
informed” at all stages of the Article 50 TEU procedure, see Article 
218 TFEU.
until mid-October 2016, with a contingency in place for a 
leap-frog appeal to the Supreme Court.
WHEN WILL THE UK TRIGGER ARTICLE 50 
TEU?
From the EU perspective, there is an argument to be made 
that Article 50(1) TEU should be set in motion as quickly 
as possible, and that the EU, comprised of all the Member 
States and its Institutions should then negotiate in good faith 
for the future stability of European integration. This is a duty 
derived from Article 4(3) TEU:
Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the 
Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, 
assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the 
Treaties.
This entails the UK, the EU and its Member States working 
positively towards a solution to Brexit, and not hindering the 
process. The EU is already adapting to the loss of the UK; 
the UK let go of its turn at chair of the EU Presidency very 
soon after 23 June 2016 and the EU-27 met in Bratislava to 
discuss the EU Brexit position on 16 September 2016.3
While the UK’s intent to withdraw has already had political 
reverberations throughout the EU and UK, and the resultant 
uncertainty had detrimental impacts, the two cannot 
3.  European Council, Bratislava Declaration and Road Map, 16 
September 2016: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2016/09/16-bratislava-declaration-and-roadmap/
Article 50 TEU reads: 
1.  Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.
2.  A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines 
provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the ar-
rangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall 
be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded 
on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, 
failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the 
Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council representing the withdraw-
ing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it.
5. A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union.
6. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in 
Article 49.
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Article 50(2) TEU addresses the content of the withdrawal 
agreement. It is open-ended, stating that ‘the Union shall 
negotiate and conclude an agreement with [the UK], setting 
out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the 
framework for its future relationship with the Union.’ This does 
not preclude trade talks forming part of the Article 50 TEU 
withdrawal agreement or taking place in parallel. In practice, 
as Article 50 TEU has never been implemented before, legal 
debates about whether the UK faces restrictions in pursuing 
trade talks are highly politicised. However it should be noted 
that including trade negotiations with the EU under Article 
50 TEU would transform the legal identity of the withdrawal 
Agreement. A parallel ‘mixed’ agreement (discussed further 
below) would need to be drawn up that will be voted on by 
the EU-27 on a unanimity basis and ratified by all of the 
Member States.  
From the UK’s perspective, even more concerning than the 
prospect of delayed trade negotiations is the initial indication 
that some EU Member States will make concluding any 
withdrawal agreement difficult for the UK if it maintains its 
commitment to restricting freedom of movement.  
The stumbling block of Single Market membership is the UK 
government’s desire to negotiate a new form of migration 
package less generous than the current approach which has 
moved beyond the free movement of labour to embrace wider 
notions of residency and Citizenship for EU national and their 
families. After the Bratislava meeting on 16 September 2016, 
the “Visegrad 4”5 indicated that these central European 
states would want a guarantee that their nationals “are 
equal” before agreeing to any deal ahead of the UK leaving 
the EU. In particular they would not countenance any dilution 
in the free movement of labour provisions if the UK is granted 
full access to the Single Market.
PM May has so far refused to guarantee the status of EU 
nationals in the UK, but insisted she wants them to stay 
after Brexit - if the rights of Britons overseas are respected. 
Briefing the Reuters news agency, the Slovakian Prime 
Minister, Mr Fico, stated with respect to existing migrants 
that:  “V4 countries will be uncompromising....Unless we feel 
a guarantee that these people (living and working in Britain) 
are equal, we will veto any agreement between the EU and 
Britain....I think Britain knows this is an issue for us where 
there’s no room for compromise.” 
The weakness of the UK’s bargaining position is seen in 
Article 50(4) TEU where the UK is unable to influence the 
negotiations between the remaining 27 Member States in the 
formal institutional framework of the Council or the European 
Council. The September 2016 Bratislava Council Meeting 
inevitably had to exclude the UK in order for the EU-27 to 
reflect on the impact of Brexit. But after the meeting and 
the statements from the Visegrad- 4 signaling a veto of any 
Single Market deal that limited free movement of labour a 
5.  The Visegrad Group comprises: the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia  
Article 50 addresses the role of the UK in the exit 
negotiations with open-ended phrasing. Article 50(4) bars 
the UK from participation in Council ‘decisions concerning it’, 
which narrowly-construed means exit negotiations, or more 
broadly any matters affecting the EU after the UK leaves 
which therefore the UK should not be able to influence. 
This suggests that the UK will be excluded from the process 
of drawing up the negotiation mandate and the extension of 
the negotiating period, which are determined by the Council. 
However the negotiations themselves will likely be conducted 
by the European Commission, not the European Council, and 
include the participation of the UK.
WHAT WILL THE ARTICLE 50 TEU 
WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT CONSIST OF?
The Article 50 TEU withdrawal agreement will capture some 
part of the process of establishing a post-Brexit relationship 
agreed by the remaining EU-27 and the UK. Yet it seems 
unlikely that Article 50 TEU will be able to cover the entirety 
of the regulatory and trade implications of the UK’s departure 
from the EU.
First, the time limit suggests that Article 50 TEU ambitions 
have to be limited. It is almost guaranteed that trade 
negotiations will take longer than two years; based on the 
EU’s prior experience of negotiating free trade agreements, 
it’s more likely to take between five and ten years. Any 
extension to the two year period has to be approved by a 
unanimous vote in the European Council. This means that, 
barring unanimous agreement for extension, this relationship 
must be negotiated either in parallel or after the UK has 
exited. 
Also, there are some indications that the EU will require the 
UK to leave the EU before negotiating key issues. Under 
Article 218(3) TFEU, the EU has exclusive competence over 
common commercial policy that includes negotiating trade 
agreements. Coupled with this, under Article 4(3) TEU, 
EU countries must work together in sincere and close co-
operation. If interpreted strictly this might suggest that the 
UK cannot act independently in order to pursue a new trade 
relationship with the EU, even informally, until the UK is no 
longer a EU Member State. As outlined below, it would also 
prohibit the UK from undertaking any trade negotiations 
with countries outside the EU. This strict interpretation is 
not necessarily legally accurate: Article 50 TEU has never 
been triggered before and signals an immediate change to 
the UK’s legal status in the EU. Added to the complexity mix 
is the fact that in recent years there has been a tendency 
for the CJEU to become involved in external relations policy. 
The recent Opinion on 8 September 2016 by the Advocate 
General Paolo Mengozzi in Opinion 1/15 that the EU-Canada 
Passenger Name Records Sharing agreement is incompatible 
with EU law is a salient reminder that political agreements 
are still subject to the rule of law. A post-Brexit agreement 
between the UK and the EU would also be susceptible to 
judicial scrutiny.
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Certain agreements fall within the exclusive competence of 
the EU and bind the UK under Article 216(2) TFEU. Other 
kinds of trade agreement are called “mixed agreements” and 
are concluded by the EU and the Member States, since parts 
of such agreements also fall within national competence. 
But the UK does not retain competence to negotiate trade 
agreements since, with the exception of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, the European Commission has 
the competence to negotiate international trade agreements 
under Article 218(3) TFEU. In addition any moves towards 
conducting negotiations with non-EU trading partners would 
also be subject to the principle of loyalty found in Article 4(3) 
TEU, outlined above. The EU has a vested interest in the 
shape of post-Brexit trade agreements. 
The UK government, on the other hand, will argue that it 
has the ability to undertake trade negotiations on the basis 
that future trade agreements with third parties will not come 
into force until after it leaves the EU.9 Dr Liam Fox, the 
international trade secretary, has indicated to the Press that 
exploratory talks with non-EU states, such as India, have 
already taken place. 10 The Sunday Times reported that legal 
advice given to Fox suggests that “... there is a high risk” of 
the European Commission starting infraction proceedings 
against the UK if such talks went ahead, with the UK being 
landed with a “big fine”.11 It is also reported that other EU 
Institutions and Members States could also start proceedings 
against the UK. This is sensational reporting of the legal 
position. Any infraction (infringement of EU law) proceedings 
brought by the European Commission under Article 258 
TFEU are not automatically brought before the European 
Court of Justice (CJEU). There is usually a long period of 
negotiation and only when talks break down will the European 
Commission go to court. This part of the process takes 
several years. If the CJEU finds a Member State in violation 
of EU law it will hand down a judgment to that effect and a 
Member State is under a duty to comply with the judgment of 
the Court. It is only when a Member State does not comply 
with the Court’s judgment that financial sanctions (fines) 
come into play under Article 260 (2) and (3) TFEU. It is 
important to realise that fines are not automatically incurred 
by a breach of EU law. The European Commission must bring 
a second action against the Member State.
However another factor renders these legal arguments moot: 
countries may well not wish to engage in trade negotiations 
until the UK has left the EU so they better understand the 
market with which they will be concluding a new trade 
9.  ‘Full text: David Davis’s Conference Speech’, The Spectator, http://
blogs.spectator.co.uk/2016/10/full-speech-david-daviss-conference-
speech/
10.  http://news.ikutseo.com/news/%E2%80%98Opportunities-are-
ENORMOUS%E2%80%99-Liam-Fox-launches-trade-talks-with-India,-
China-and-Singapore/
11.  Henry Zeffman and Bruno Waterfield “Trade talks could land 
Britain with big fine from EU”, The Times 19 September 2016. 
hard bargaining position emerged. Thus the two-year period 
could expire with the UK leaving the EU and no clear promise 
of a future trade relationship.  Shuttle diplomacy and bilateral 
talks between the UK and the other EU Member States will 
be inevitable. It may be that a third country, or an acceptable 
arbitrator is brought in to ease the dialogue.
It has been suggested that if the UK cannot work out a 
new trade deal in the two-year time frame this is not a dire 
scenario since there is always the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) to fall back on. However, applying existing EU tariffs 
agreed in the WTO to trade between the EU and UK will be 
an expensive option at best. The Institute for Fiscal Studies’ 
synthesis of various models suggested that - under a ‘WTO 
rules’ scenario - trade between the UK and EU will fall 
between 17 and 29 per cent and GDP will reduce between 
2.6-3.1 per cent.6 
Also, there will be implications in the WTO as the UK reverts 
to independent membership separate from the EU. The UK 
can propose that it and the EU maintain the same tariff levels 
as when they acted as a Customs Union. Or it might submit 
a revised tariff schedule on the basis that it is reverting to its 
status as an independent WTO Member. In both cases it could 
argue that these changes are of a purely formal character, 
such that they do not need to be agreed multilaterally.7 But 
other WTO Member States might refuse, and - for economic 
or political reasons - require consultation and negotiation, 
a more involved undertaking. Furthermore, there are some 
areas, such as agricultural Tariff Rate Quotas, where the 
EU and UK have shared commitments, and a complex 
disentangling process will be unavoidable. This means that 
the WTO option, rather than a fall back, is a negotiation unto 
itself. If these negotiations stall and countries initiate disputes 
against the UK or the EU, they will be in uncharted legal 
territory.
There could be more predictability if, rather than relying on 
WTO rules, the EU and UK pursue the use of transitional 
arrangements to manage the time period when the UK has 
formally exited the EU but before the two have agreed and 
ratified their new trade relationship. The Financial Times 
recently reported that May’s government have not ruled this 
out and are considering options such as continuing to pay for 
access to the Single Market to ease the transition.8 
Another major legal question concerns the trade relationships 
that the EU and UK envisage with the rest of the world. Trade 
relationships between the EU and the rest of the world are 
regulated by two different types of international agreements. 
6.  Emmerson, C. et al., ‘Brexit and the UK’s Public Finances’, Institute 
for Fiscal Studies Report 116, May 2016, available at https://www.ifs.
org.uk/uploads/publications/comms/r116.pdf (accessed 26 September 
2016). 
7.  GATT Contracting Parties, Procedures for Modification and 
Rectification of Schedules of Tariff Concessions, Decision of 26 March 
1980. 
8.  George Parker et al., ‘UK looks for transitional trade deal after 
Brexit’, Financial Times, 4 October 2016. 
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agreement. The US12 and Australia13, for example, have 
adopted this position.
IS ARTICLE 50 TEU REVERSIBLE?
A Member State is able to choose the option of leaving the 
EU and re-joining. Re-joining might not be as protracted as 
the current negotiations with would-be new accession states, 
but it is very unrealistic to assume that the EU would allow 
the UK a new “pick and mix” accession to the EU.
One issue that is not covered in Article 50 TEU is whether a 
withdrawing Member State can change its mind. 
The wording of Article 50 TEU does not appear to allow a 
Member State to revoke the Article 50 TEU trigger. It specifies 
that EU treaties will cease to apply after two years, and that 
the only route to re-joining is through the normal procedure. 
Yet the weight of academic opinion is that Article 50 TEU 
does allow for a Member State to revoke the application 
to withdraw and simply revert to the status quo. Politically 
speaking, the UK‘s partial withdrawal – and exclusion – from 
some EU institutional activities as well as the widespread 
uncertainty of impending withdrawal has already rocked the 
EU and an on-off marriage can hardly be tolerated for any 
length of time, nor does it currently appear that the UK is 
courting one.
12.  Charlotte Ryan and Joe Mayes, ‘Kerry says no U.S. – U.K. trade 
deal until Brexit talks concluded’, Bloomberg, 19 July 2016, available 
at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-19/kerry-says-
no-u-s-u-k-trade-deal-until-brexit-talks-concluded (accessed 5 October 
2016).
13.  Peter Walker, ‘No free trade deal until Brexit settled, says 
Australian minister’, The Guardian, 7 September 2016, https://www.
theguardian.com/politics/2016/sep/07/no-free-trade-deal-until-brexit-
settled-australian-minister-steven-ciobo (accessed 5 October 2016).
CONCLUSION
The referendum result pits the mandate of direct democracy 
against Parliamentary Sovereignty, the UK constitution’s 
defining principle.
The two-year negotiation period that commences once Article 
50 TEU is triggered is a very short time to unravel over 40 
years of EU membership. Furthermore, the withdrawal process 
is heavily weighted in favour of the EU 27, with the European 
Council responsible for drawing up the withdrawal guidelines, 
which process will be led by the European Commission. Article 
50 (4) bars the UK from participating in Council ‘Decisions 
concerning it’. This suggests that the UK will be excluded from 
the process of drawing up the negotiation mandate and the 
extension period.
It is unlikely that Article 50 TEU will be able to cover the 
entirety of the regulatory and trade implications of the UK’s 
departure from the EU as trade negotiations will undoubtedly 
take more than two years, probably nearer ten in some cases. 
Added to which, if strictly interpreted, under Article 4 (3) the 
UK may be prevented from pursuing new trade deals, even 
informally, until it is no longer a EU Member State. However, 
there may be room for parallel discussions. Furthermore, 
some EU Member States may make withdrawal difficult if 
the UK maintains its commitment to restricting freedom of 
movement.
If a new trade deal is not negotiated within the timeframe 
of the withdrawal process, falling back on existing WU tariffs 
agreed in the WTO between the EU and the UK will be an 
expensive option and not without the need for a negotiation 
process. 
There is lack of clarity as to whether the UK can undertake 
trade negotiations with third parties before it leaves the EU. 
In addition, countries may well not wish to engage in trade 
negotiations until the UK has left the EU in order to better 
understand the market.
It should be noted that as Article 50 TEU has never been 
implemented before, legal debates about whether the UK 
faces restrictions in pursuing trade talks are highly politicised.
TR IGGER ING  ART IC LE  50  TEU  –  A  LEGAL  ANALYS IS
FURTHER INFORMATION
This document was written by Erika Szyszczak and Emily 
Lydgate. The authors would like to thank L. Alan Winters and 
Patrick Low for very helpful comments and suggestions. Any 
remaining errors are those of the authors. 
The UK Trade Policy observatory (UKTPO), a partnership 
between the University of Sussex and Chatham House, is an 
independent expert group that: 
1) initiates, comments on and analyses trade policy proposals 
for the UK; and 
2) trains British policy makers, negotiators and other 
interested parties through tailored training packages. 
The UKTPO is committed to engaging with a wide variety of 
stakeholders to ensure that the UK’s international trading 
environment is reconstructed in a manner that benefits all 
in Britain and is fair to Britain, the EU and the world. The 
Observatory offers a wide range of expertise and services 
to help support government departments, international 
organisations and businesses to strategise and develop new 
trade policies in the post-Brexit era.
For further information on this theme or the work of the UK 
Trade Observatory, please contact:
Professor L Alan Winters 
Director 
UK Trade Policy Observatory
University of Sussex, Room 280, Jubilee Building, Falmer, 
BN1 9SL
Email: uktpo@sussex.ac.uk
Website: https://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/uktpo/
Twitter: @UK_TPO
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